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RESUMO 
 
 
A presente dissertação explora a relação entre dois temas actualmente muito 
importantes para a literatura da área das finanças: a política de dividendos e a incerteza 
da informação. O nosso principal objectivo é perceber de que forma a literatura 
existente trata estes dois temas de forma conjunta. A investigação é conduzida através 
do método da revisão sistemática de literatura, sendo a nossa principal conclusão de 
que, exceptuando os trabalhos de Chay and Suh (2009) e Bradley, Capozza and Seguin 
(1996, 1998), nenhum outro estudo aborda a política de dividendos na óptica da 
incerteza da informação.  
 
O estudo foi iniciado por uma revisão de literatura onde foram previamente 
seleccionadas palavras-chave, correntes de pesquisa e critérios de selecção por forma a 
abranger o máximo número de artigos possível. Estes são depois restringidos aos mais 
importantes para a presente pesquisa através dos critérios de selecção, tendo em conta 
que, na politica de dividendos o estudo se centra apenas na sinalização, assimetria de 
informação e conflitos de agência e relativamente à incerteza da informação centra-se  
mais em concreto no efeito que esta tem no valor de um empresa. 
 
Após a pesquisa efectuada nas bases de dados EBSCO, Web of Science and SSRN 
foram seleccionados 23 artigos. Uma breve descrição destes é posteriormente 
apresentada no ponto dos resultados. A descrição dos artigos seleccionados apresenta-se 
separada por temas por forma a facilitar a compreensão. 
 
viii 
 
Por último, na conclusão, relacionam-se os artigos seleccionados de forma a encontrar 
questões que possam vir a ser alvos de estudo em trabalhos posteriores, como por 
exemplo, ao nível de um doutoramento. 
 
Em suma, com esta revisão sistemática de literatura, pretende-se contribuir para uma 
maior percepção de como se podem relacionar a politica de dividendos e a incerteza da 
informação. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Palavras-chave: Política de Dividendos, Incerteza da Informação, Assimetria, 
Sinalização 
 ix 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study is a systematic literature review of two areas of the finance literature: 
dividend policy and information uncertainty. My objective is identifying suitable 
research gaps to be explored at the PhD level. A brief overview of the thematic under 
analysis is presented in the first part of the study. Subsequently, a detailed analysis of 
the systematic literature review methodology is provided, including both the search 
strategy employed and the different selection criteria used. The last part presents the 
results. My main conclusion is that both themes have received considerable attention 
from many finance scholars but some interesting research questions still remain 
unsettled, providing the context for future research in the field. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Dividend Policy, Information Uncertainty, Asymmetry, Signalling 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Dividend policy is at the very core of corporate finance and, despite the existing 
literature, a number of issues still remain unsettled. As such, clear guidelines for a 
suitable definition of an “optimal payout policy” have not emerged. As Black (1998) 
puts it: “the harder we look at dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle that just 
don’t fit together”. 
 
Some scholars argue that dividends may be used as a signalling mechanism (Ikenberry 
and Julio, 2004; Asquith and Mullins, 1983). Others claim that dividends minimize 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Miller and Rock; 1985); while 
many others suggest that dividends are useful for reducing agency conflicts (Kouki, 
2009; Harada and Nguyen; 2006). These theories share a common idea: dividends are 
important tools for mitigating information uncertainty (IU). Interestingly, Jiang, Lee and 
Zhang (2005), define IU in terms of “value ambiguity”, i.e., the degree to which a firm’s 
value can be estimated by even the most knowledgeable investors at reasonable costs.  
 
A few recent studies examine how known financial anomalies may be explained by 
investor’s reliance on incomplete information, which is generally affected by 
information uncertainty. In this context, some scholars argue that IU can lead investors 
to rationally price stocks in an apparently inefficient manner (Timmerman, 1993, 
Lewellen and Shanken, 2002, and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O´Hara, 2002); while others 
suggest that cognitive biases such as investor overconfidence explain why some market 
pricing anomalies can occur (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). This dissertation 
adds to this literature by exploring to what extent the IU argument can be used to 
explain the dividend puzzle using a systematic review of the literature. In particular, as 
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suggested by Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003), such method is used to explore to 
what extent there is a gap in the literature in this context. The main advantage of a 
systematic literature review is that it requires the definition of an auditable process, 
which helps avoiding many issues that weaken the traditional narrative review of the 
literature. As result, potential links between the dividend policy literature and the IU 
literature are made explicit, which enables identifying, selecting and reviewing all the 
relevant studies.  
 
In this study, I show that there is an important gap in the literature as no study has 
clearly explored how the dividend puzzle relates to IU. In particular, with the exception 
of Chay and Suh (2009) and Bradley and Capozza (1996, 1998), I could not find studies 
that specifically show how the known theories of the dividend policy (e.g., agency 
conflicts, signalling and information asymmetry) are impacted by IU. Furthermore, I 
also attempt to find suitable questions to be explored in subsequent research.  
  
The study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the main theoretical issues of 
both the dividend policy and information uncertainty themes. Chapter 3 presents the 
methodology of the systematic literature review in detail while Chapter 4 presents the 
findings. Chapter 5 details the author’s learning experience and concludes.  
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2. Key Literature 
This chapter is divided in three sections. The first, about dividend policy, briefly refers 
some dividend theories. The second deals with the issue of information uncertainty, by 
exploring its meaning and impact on firms’ valuation. The third section shows why it is 
interesting to look at the link between IU and firms’ dividend policy. 
 
2.1 Dividend policy 
Dividends are simply the distribution of a company’s profits to its shareholders. The 
finance literature has long debated to what extent the dividend policy can affect market 
value. In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1961) show that, in a world 
without taxes and no other market imperfections, firm value is only a function of its 
future cash-flows and the risk associated to such cash-flows. Hence, in this world, 
dividends are irrelevant in the sense they cannot affect firm value. 
 
Modern financial markets are, however, very different from those proposed by 
Modigliani and Miller (1961). For example, taxation is a common feature of all 
developed countries and seems to play an important role in the context of the dividend 
payout policy. Brennan (1970) is one of the first studies that explicitly considers the 
impact of taxation when examining the relation between dividend yields and risk-
adjusted returns. He shows that the pre-tax excess returns are positively and linearly 
related to the dividend returns and systematic risk. Such paper concludes that dividends’ 
tax disadvantage is, in general, compensated by higher pre-tax returns. Blume (1980), 
however, argues that the correlation of stock returns and dividend yields is very 
complex and cannot be explained solely by tax effects, claiming that higher dividend 
payout ratios lead to higher company’s future profits. This rationale reflects 
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misunderstandings about the nature of payout policy irrelevance in frictionless markets 
and the implications of adding personal taxes to the standard finance model.  
 
Gordon (1963) takes a different approach and puts forward the “bird-in-hand theory”. 
Such theory states that shareholders might prefer cash dividends to capital gains simply 
because the former are less risky than the latter. Hence, according to Gordon (1963), 
firms with high dividend payout ratios should, ceteris paribus, have higher market 
value. In another classical contribution, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) suggest 
that dividend policy has a potential “clientele” effect, i.e., firms can influence the 
demand for their shares by following a particular dividend policy. For instance, growth 
firms that pay no dividends should be more interesting for younger investors, who are 
willing to trade current savings for future capital gains; in sharp contrast, retirees should 
be keen on investing on mature firms that pay steady and relative high dividends. In line 
with such prediction, Pettit (1977) presents some evidence that older investors are more 
likely to hold high dividend paying shares, a result he attributes to the fact that such 
investors are usually in the lower income tax brackets. 
 
Firms can also use their dividend policy to communicate with the market (e.g., Pacheco, 
1999). This is particularly relevant if one recognizes the importance of the information 
asymmetry that exists between managers and the other corporate stakeholders. For 
instance, in a survey addressing the issue of reappearing dividends, Ikenberry and Julio 
(2004), argue that firms needing to signal confidence may use dividends to express such 
message. Similarly, Miller and Rock (1985) claim that firms may use dividends to 
minimize information asymmetry. In particular, they argue that firms with interesting 
future prospects have an incentive to pay relatively higher dividends than similar firms 
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with poorer future perspectives. Such difference in the payout ratio should be 
recognized by the market and priced accordingly. Asquith and Mullins (1983) argue that 
dividends also motivate managers to take more efficient decisions that avoid the 
disclosure of pessimist signals in the future. However, Easterbrook (1994) claims that 
an increase in dividends is only an unambiguous good signal if the market can 
distinguish between firms that are in a growth stage from those who are already 
reducing their investments. Interestingly, Charest (1978), Healy and Krishna (1988), 
and Josef and Dotan (1994) show that a reduction in the dividend payout ratio (i.e., a 
pessimist signal) has more profound impact in firms’ stock price than a similar increase 
in dividends (i.e., a optimist signal). Moreover, Arnott and Asness (2001) find that low 
payout ratios historically precede low earnings growth, i.e., when managers are 
optimistic (pessimistic) due to its private information they tend to pay a large (small) 
share of earnings. 
  
Agency conflicts, as Jensen and William (1976) and Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggest, 
can lead managers to allocate resources to activities that benefit them privately, but that 
are not in shareholders’ best interest. As such, shareholders need to implement 
monitoring measures, which generate agency costs. Jensen (1986) points out that 
managers have an incentive to let their firms grow beyond the optimal size because 
growth increases the amount of resources under their control. Clearly, such issue is 
more severe in firms with large free cash flows as they have more cash available than 
profitable investment opportunities. In this context, Easterbrook (1984) and DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Stulz (2004) among others, view dividends as a potential solution to 
agency conflicts. Dividend paying firms commit cash to such regular payments, which 
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lowers the ability of managers to use such cash to maximize their own utility at the 
shareholders’ expense.  
 
2.2 Information Uncertainty 
Future events are, by their very nature, uncertain. Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2005) define 
IU in terms of “value ambiguity”, i.e., the degree to which a firm’s value can be 
estimated by even the most knowledgeable investors at reasonable costs. Under this set 
up, a high-IU firm is a company with less “knowable” cash flows, perhaps due to the 
nature of its business or operating environment. In general, such firms should be 
associated with higher information costs and the estimation process of their fundamental 
value is inherently less reliable and more volatile. In this context, Avramov and Hore 
(2008) show that the concentration of momentum in high information uncertainty and 
high credit stocks is consistent with rational asset pricing, i.e., momentum is more 
pronounced in stocks with high return volatility, high cash flow volatility, small market 
capitalization, high analysts´ earnings forecast dispersion, as well as high credit risk. 
Kurz and Motolese (2001) present a study addressing the issue of endogenous 
uncertainty and market volatility. They define endogenous uncertainty as the component 
of economic risk and market volatility which is propagated within the economy by the 
beliefs and actions of agents and also consider this kind of uncertainty to be the most 
dominant form of uncertainty in our society. 
 
A number of studies examine how various financial anomalies can be explained by 
investors’ reliance on incomplete information, which is generally affected by IU.  In this 
context, Timmerman (1993), Lewellen and Shanken, (2002) and Easley, Hvidkjaer and 
O’Hara, (2002) argue that IU can lead investors to rational price equities in an 
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apparently inefficient manner. On the other hand, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 
(1996), show that cognitive biases such as investor overconfidence explain why some 
market pricing anomalies may occur. In this context, Banks and Kinney (1982) 
reinforce the notion that uncertainty qualifications are associated with declines in stock 
price.   
 
2.3 Summary 
Uncertainty is associated with market volatility and risk, both of which affect how 
information flows from firms to current or potential investors. The same uncertainty 
also impacts managers’ behaviour and decisions. Thus, it is possible that firms may use 
the dividend policy to mitigate information uncertainty. If this is the case, high-IU 
(which are exposed to higher levels of information asymmetry and agency costs), 
should have more generous and less volatile dividend payout ratios. This very general 
preposition allow us to explore whether the IU argument can be used to explain the 
dividend puzzle.  
 
Interestingly, and to the best of my knowledge, no study to date has linked firms’ 
dividend policy with the idea that firms face different levels of information uncertainty. 
In the next sections I employ a systematic literature review to ascertain to what extent 
this is (still) a relevant gap in this area. Using the systematic review method ensures that 
my effort to map the field is auditable and ensures that my conclusions are replicable by 
others. The next chapters summarize my methodological approach, findings and present 
my conclusions. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This study employs a systematic approach in order to identify and analyse the relevant 
literature concerning dividend policy and information uncertainty. Section 1 introduces 
the basic concepts of the systematic literature review methodology and justifies its 
aptness. Section 2 show how such method is used in my particular case, describing the 
keywords, search strings, databases and selection criteria that are used. Section 3 
concludes. 
 
3.1. Traditional literature review vs. systematic literature review 
Hart (1998) defines literature review as “the selection of available documents on the 
topic, which contain information, ideas, data and evidence written from a particular 
standpoint to fulfil certain aims or express certain views on the nature of the topic and 
how it is to be investigated, and the effective evaluation of these documents in relation 
to the research being proposed”.  A literature review can be undertaken using two key 
approaches: the traditional and the systematic. Under the former, researchers do not 
have precise guidelines on how to collect and analyse the potentially relevant 
contributions for their research. In contrast, the latter adopts a replicable, scientific and 
transparent process to identify and assess both published and unpublished research, 
while mitigating potential biases that may arise due to the preferences of the researcher 
(Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003). My study thus employs the systematic review 
method to analyse the existing literature concerning dividend policy and information 
uncertainty. To the best of my knowledge, both themes have been studied separately 
and therefore, I focus on the issues that can be directly linked in order to build a strong 
theoretical framework for my arguments.  
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3.2. Protocol description 
This sub-section starts by discussing the major steps of the systematic literature review 
process. It continues by describing the specific research protocol developed to undertake 
this study’s systematic literature review. 
 
3.2.1 Process overview 
My systematic review process is schematically described in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Systematic review procedure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The implementation of this protocol provides a scientific character to the review, which 
improves the quality of the findings. In general, researchers that follow a similar 
protocol to conduct their literature review are able to minimize errors that would 
naturally arise in the context of a traditional review. The next section provides an 
example of how this protocol may be used in practice. 
Stage 1: Planing the review 
Step 1 – Forming a review panel 
Step 2 – Mapping your field of study 
Step 3 – Producing a review protocol 
Stage 2: Identify and evaluating studies 
Step 4 – Conducting a systematic search 
Step 5 – Evaluating studies 
Stage 3: Extracting and synthesizing data 
Step 6 – Conducting data extraction 
Step 7 – Conducting data synthesis 
Stage 4: Reporting 
Step 8 – Reporting the findings 
Stage 5: Utilising the findings 
Step 9 – Informing research 
Step 10 – Informing practice 
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3.2.2 Research Protocol  
This sub-section presents a description of the different steps used to develop the 
systematic review. The process is initiated with a scoping study, which consists of a 
loose literature review on the subject in which the researcher is interested in. In the 
particular case of this dissertation, the scoping study was the groundwork of chapters 1 
and 2. 
 
3.2.2.1 Consultation group and brief description of the consultation process 
This systematic review of the literature is not a personal project entirely. Indeed, 
although it is mostly an individual effort, I benefited from the involvement of other 
people along the way. In particular, right from the beginning I set up a consultation 
panel to help me develop my research protocol. Such consultation panel plays two 
different and complementary roles within the development of a systematic literature 
review. The first is to provide guidance and expert advice on several aspects of the 
review. This ensures that all relevant literature is covered during the process. On the 
other hand, the review panel also acts as an auditor of the entire process. This means the 
panel members not only give advice but they also provide valuable input by 
constructively criticizing both the contents and process of the review. Table 3.1 shows 
the composition of my systematic review panel: 
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Table 3.1 – consultation panel for the systematic review 
 
Person Title/Organisation Role in the review 
Dr. Luís Coelho 
Assistante Professor of Finance, 
Faculdade de Economia da 
Universidade do Algarve 
Co-supervisor 
Dr. Rúben Peixinho 
Assistante Professor of Finance, 
Faculdade de Economia da 
Universidade do Algarve 
Co-supervisor 
Dra. Clara Pires Assistante Professor of Finance, Instituto Politécnico de Beja External Advisor 
 
The members of the panel are selected according to their contribution in the finance 
area. My foremost inspiration was Professor Luís Coelho, who helped identify a topic 
that I am comfortable with and also provided guidance in the choice of keywords and 
research strings used in this systematic literature review. His supervision has been 
crucial to find the correct direction for my research and a source of motivation. I also 
benefited from the involvement of Professor Rúben, whose assistance was very helpful 
throughout my review. He offered many hours of his time to clarify and debate issues 
related to my project and the field in general. As an external academic, I involved 
Professor Clara Pires, given her expertise in the field and also has a vast amount of 
related research experience. 
 
3.2.2.2. Search strategy 
Developing a valid search strategy is a critical step in the systematic review process, as 
this delimits the subject topic. The first step of the process is identifying relevant 
academic studies in pre-determined electronic databases. In order to achieve such goal, 
a set of keywords are generated and different search strings are devised. I relied heavily 
on the help of the panel members to achieve such objective, with the following table 
presenting the keywords used in the study: 
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Table 3.2 – Keywords used in the systematic literature review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By combining such set of keywords, I define the following search strings: 
 
Search string 1: 
(Dividend AND policy) OR (Dividend AND announcements) OR (dividend AND 
puzzle) OR (payout policy). 
 
The first search string is designed to capture studies that relate to firm’s dividend policy. 
 
Search string 2: 
[(Dividend policy) AND (agency costs)] OR [(dividend policy) AND signaling)] OR 
[(dividend policy) AND asymmetry)]. 
 
This second restricts the papers to those addressing dividend policy and that focus on 
the more relevant dividend theories for my survey. 
 
 
Domain keywords 
Dividend Policy 
Dividend (s) 
Announcement(s) 
Puzzle 
Agency costs 
Signaling 
Asymmetry 
Payout policy 
Information Uncertainty 
Information 
Uncertainty 
Reliable 
Anomalies 
Asymmetric 
Incomplete 
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Search string 3 
(Information uncertainty) AND (reliable information) OR [(Information uncertainty) 
AND anomalies] OR [(Information uncertainty) AND asymmetric information] OR 
[(Information uncertainty) AND (incomplete information)]. 
 
This last string captures papers that address the issue of information uncertainty. 
 
3.2.2.3. Selection criteria 
The use of the abovementioned search strings allows identifying a set of papers that are 
potentially interesting for my area of interest. However, only a fraction should be 
significant to my research. As a result, a set of predetermined selection criteria are 
designed to ensure that only high quality papers that make a relevant contribution to my 
study are reviewed in depth in the present dissertation. The next paragraphs detail such 
selection criteria. 
 
Broad selection criteria 
The first stage of the selection process consists of analyzing the titles and abstracts of 
the papers identified with the three search strings. I employ a set of exclusion criteria to 
ensure that only the relevant papers are considered past this initial stage, all of which are 
presented in table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 – Exclusion criteria and rationale (Title and Abstract) 
 
Criteria Rationale 
1. I eliminate articles published in other sources than 
scholarly journals, with the exception of SSRN 
working papers and papers suggested by the panel. 
Magazines, newspaper articles, and similar 
sources of information lack scientific rigor. 
2. Studies that mention the keywords of interest as 
residual issues or in other areas than accounting and 
finance. 
In some cases, the search strings identify 
papers that are in other areas of research than 
accounting and finance; in addition, many 
papers that mention my keywords consider 
dividend policy and/or IU as residual issues. 
3. Studies that focus on other dividend theories 
besides signaling, agency costs and asymmetry. 
These are the three dividend theories that are 
more easily reconcilable with the notion of IU. 
 
All studies identified that do not fall into at least one of the abovementioned exclusion 
criteria are assessed by the selection criteria for full papers. Details of such criteria are 
presented in the next paragraphs. 
  
Selection criteria for full papers 
1. Empirical paper -  in order to be included, empirical papers must 
provide/describe/state: 
 A clear definition of the sample (first and last year of the sample, sectors 
included, nationality of the sample firms, descriptive characteristics such 
as size distribution, etc.); 
 A clear definition of the variables and methodologies employed; 
 The relation with existing theory and previous work; 
 Contribution to the existing knowledge; 
 The empirical results and their significance. Moreover, the paper must 
also provide a clear interpretation of the results in the context of the 
existing literature and relevant theory; 
 The methodological shortcomings that may reduce the possibility to 
generalize from the presented results. 
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2. Non-empirical papers – in order to be included, such papers must present/define: 
 The aim of the model and relation with existing theory and previous 
work; 
 Its contribution to existing knowledge; 
 The assumptions of the model; 
 The variables, parameters and equations clearly; 
 Explicit proofs of the most important results and theorems. 
 
Beyond the abovementioned exclusion and selection criteria for abstracts, titles and full 
papers, a quality appraisal tool is also applied. I use a similar methodology to that of 
Marcos (2000) to address this issue. Such methodology analyses five different 
dimensions of each paper: contribution to knowledge, discussion of the underlying 
theory, use of appropriate methodology, data analysis and discussion of the limitations 
of the study. The details of the quality assessment tool are provided in the following 
table: 
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Table 3.4 – A Critical Appraisal Tool for the Systematic Review 
 
                 Level 
 
 
Elements to Consider 
 
0 – Low or absence 
 
1 - Medium 
 
2 - High 
 
Not Applicable 
Contribution to 
knowledge 
This article does not provide enough 
information to assess this criteria 
Contribution to knowledge 
exists but is limited in 
importance and/or 
significance 
Significant addition 
to current knowledge 
Not applicable to 
this paper 
Discussion of the 
Underlying Theory 
This article does not provide enough 
information to assess this criteria 
There is a connection between 
the paper’s theoretical basis 
and extant theoretical 
knowledge in the field; 
empirical papers built on 
existing theory 
Excellent discussion 
of the model; good 
review of prior 
literature 
Not applicable to 
this paper 
Use of Appropriate 
Methodology 
This article does not provide enough 
information to assess this criteria 
Justified research design: 
acceptable methodology to 
develop the paper’s idea 
Adequate research 
design; adequate 
choice of relevant 
proxies 
Not applicable to 
this paper 
Data Analysis This article does not provide enough information to assess this criteria 
Appropriate sample, results 
are relevant for understanding 
the aim of the paper 
Adequate data 
samples; results are 
significant and 
enable the reader to 
draw conclusions 
about the paper’s aim 
Not applicable to 
this paper 
Limitation of the Study This article does not provide enough information to assess this criteria 
Paper mentions its limitations 
but does not explain their 
relevance to understand the 
results 
Paper states clearly 
its limitations; 
implications are 
acknowledged 
Not applicable to 
this paper 
 
Papers are considered for the systematic review if: 1) do not score two zeros in the five 
different categories above and 2) score a two at least once in any of the five categories 
above. 
 
3.2.2.4. Data extraction 
Data is extracted from the studies that are suitable for the aims of the systematic review 
and that meet all the selection criteria above. Table 3.5 provides an example of the data 
extraction form used in this study. 
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Table 3.5 – Sample of the Data Extraction Form 
 
Author name Chay, B., J. and Suh, J.  
Article Title Payout policy and cash-flow uncertainty 
Journal Title Journal of Financial Economics 
Author Affiliation Sungkyunkwan University / Ewha Womans University 
Publication Date 2009 
Volume 93 
Page Number 88-107 
Research Category Empirical 
Data description 5000 firms from seven major countries (Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, the UK and the U.S) over the 1994-2005 period. The 
source of the data is Worldscope. 
Quality Assessment  
Contribution to Knowledge 2 
Discussion of underlying theory 2 
Use of appropriate methodology 2 
Data analysis 2 
Limitations 2 
Include (yes/No) Yes 
Exclusion Reason N/A 
Related Papers Lintner, J. (1956), Brav, A., Graham, J., Harvey C., Michaely, R., (2005). 
Fama and French, (2001), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, (2006) 
Location of item http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X09000415 
 
Key findings They find that firms with high cash-flow uncertainty tend to pay low 
dividends and are also less likely to pay dividends. Hence, cash-flow 
uncertainty appears to be an important factor, not only in explaining a 
firm’s sectional variation of the amount and probability of dividends, but 
also, in explaining a firm’s choice of payout method 
Abstract The importance of cash-flow uncertainty in payout policy has received 
little attention in empirical studies, while survey studies such as Lintner, J., 
1956. Distribution of incomes of operations among dividends, retained 
earnings, and taxes. American Economic Review 46, 97-113. and Brav, 
A., Graham, J., Harvey C., Michaely, R., 2005. Payout policy in the 21st 
century. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483-527 indicate its 
importance. With worldwide firm-level data, we present evidence that 
cash-flow uncertainty is an important cross-sectional determinant of 
corporate payout policy. Our results show that across countries, cash-flow 
uncertainty, as proxied by stock return volatility, has a negative impact on 
the amount of dividends as well as the probability of paying dividends. 
The impact of cash-flow uncertainty on dividends is generally stronger 
than the impact of other potential determinants of payout policy such as 
the earned/contributed capital mix, agency conflicts, and investment 
opportunities. We also find that the effect of cash-flow uncertainty on 
dividends is distinct from the effect of a firm´s financial life-cycle stage. 
Critique Well-structured. Good methodology. Solid theoretical basis and well-
related with previous research. 
Keywords Cash-flow uncertainty, Dividend, Repurchase 
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3.3 Literature synthesis process 
The last step in the systematic review is to synthesize the selected papers into a 
connected whole. This is important in order to understand the research topic and to 
identify connections and patterns within the literature. Moreover, it helps identifying 
potential gaps in the literature. Accordingly, I considered a “literature tree” to help map 
out the structure of my research topic. Dividend policy and information uncertainty 
constitute the starting points of this structure. Given that my topic consists of the 
connection of two different areas, particular emphasis is given to the issues that can be 
linked.  
I also raised the following questions that help me determine the structure of my 
literature synthesis: 
1. What do we already know in the areas related to my research topic? 
2. What are the characteristics of the key concepts? 
3. What are the relationships between these key concepts? 
4. What are the existing theories? 
5. How can my research contribute to a better understanding of my research 
questions? 
 
The next chapter summarizes the major findings of the papers identified with the search 
protocol now presented. 
 
 
 
 Universidade Do Algarve 
 
19 
Dividend Policy and Information Uncertainty 
4. FINDINGS 
This chapter presents my findings, which are divided in two parts. The first explains the 
selection of the key literature; the second summarizes the papers that comply with all 
the exclusion criteria cited above. 
 
4.1. Descriptive analysis of the selected papers 
4.1.1. Process description 
As mentioned in sub-section 3.3, the search strings are initially used with EBSCO, Web 
of Science and SSRN. Table 4.1 summarizes the number of papers by database 
identified in the first step of the process. 
 
Table 4.1 – All papers and all search strings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 shows that a total of 9122 documents were identified using my search strings. 
Such voluminous literature was reduced using the exclusion criteria for titles and 
abstracts as well as for full texts. The results of such selection are presented in table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 – Selection of papers process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of papers identified 
Search String EBSCO Web of Science SSRN Total 
Search String 1 2545 1254 1293 5092 
Search String 2 134 166 135 435 
Search String 3 661 2581 353 3595 
Total 3340 4001 1781 9122 
Documents from all sources 9122 
Papers excluded based on criterion 1 -6472 
Papers excluded based on criterion 2 -1563 
Papers excluded based on criterion 3 -1068 
Papers excluded based on the reading of full text -2 
Papers included based on cross-references +3 
Papers included based on panel suggestions +3 
Final sample of papers for the systematic review 23 
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As shown in table 4.2, numerous papers were excluded due to their deficient 
classification in the original databases, or because they were from other areas than 
accounting and finance or because our main topics only simple marginal in the paper.  
Two empirical papers were also removed as they did not comply with all the 
requirements for such type of paper.  
Table 4.2 also shows that I include three extra papers in my final list following the 
advice of the panel. Furthermore, three interesting papers were identified by cross 
referencing the original studies selected through my search protocol. In the end, the 
final numbers of papers included in my final review of the literature is 23. 
 
4.1.2. Descriptive statistics 
This sub-section provides some basic statistics about the final sample of 23 papers 
included in my review. Table 4.3 presents the list of the 23 papers included in my 
review. 
 
Table 4.3 – List of papers included in the final systematic literature review 
 
1. Angelini and Guazzarotti (2009) 
2. Arnott and Asness (2001) 
3. Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1996) 
4. Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) 
5. Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu (2007) 
6. Chay and Suh (2009) 
7. Chen, Shevlin and Tong (2004) 
8. De Angelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2004) 
9. Erickson, Wang and Zhang (2007) 
10. Farinha (2002) 
11. Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2010) 
12. Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2003) 
13. Harada and Nguyen (2006) 
14. Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2005) 
15. Kandel and Pearson (1995) 
16. Khang and King (2002) 
17. Kouki (2009) 
18. Lee (2007) 
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Table 4.3 – List of papers included in the final systematic literature review 
 
19. Li and Zhao (2008) 
20. Naceur, Goaied and Belanes (2006) 
21. Yoon and Starks (1995) 
22. Zhang (2006a) 
23. Zhang (2006b) 
 
The next figure shows the number of publications per year. 
 
Figure 4.2 - Number of Publications Per Year 
 
 
 
 
As shown in figure 4.2, most of the studies included in the final list are published after 
2000. In fact, I can only report four studies from 1995 (which is the year of publication 
of the first study included in the review) to 2000. Figure 2 also shows that the 2000-
2010 period was the most productive in terms of literature directly related to my 
research interest. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the distribution of the selected papers by journal, which helps 
understand where the research relating to my topic is being published. 
 
 
 
       
	




	
	




	
	









	






	
 Universidade Do Algarve 
 
22 
Dividend Policy and Information Uncertainty 
 
Table 4.4 – Distribution of the Papers Included in the Review by Journal and Area  
 
As can be seen, most of the published research that I consider in my final list is 
published in finance and accounting journals (eight out of 23 papers). However, most 
studies are still working papers, available on SSRN. This shows that my research area is 
still not truly consolidated, which suggests that important gaps in the literature may 
exist. 
 
The selected papers can also be divided into the empirical and non-empirical category. 
Table 4.5 lays out the number of papers under each category uncovered with my 
database search. 
 
Table 4.5 – Empirical and Non-empirical Studies to Assess with Full Paper 
                   Criteria  
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen, most of the papers included in the final review are of empirical nature.  
 
Finance and Accounting    Economics & Decision Science   
Contemporary Accounting Research 1 Journal of Political Economy 1 
Journal of Financial Economics 1 Real Estate Economics 1 
Financial Management 1   
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 1   
International Review of Finance 1   
Review of Accounting Studies 1   
The Journal of Finance 1   
The Review of Financial Studies 1     
Total 8 Total 2 
Working  Papers                                                                    Total 13   
Nature of paper Number of papers 
Empirical (Quantitative) 22 
Non-Empirical 1 
Total 23 
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4.2 Report of the findings 
This section provides a description of the findings. The first part addresses the issue of 
dividend policy and the second part addresses information uncertainty. 
 
4.2.1 Dividend policy  
Dividends convey unique valuable information for firms’ insiders and outsiders. The 
importance and relevance of the dividend policy has been empirically demonstrated by 
several studies. For instance, Arnott and Asness (2002) observe a sample drawn from 
Standard and Poors from 1926 to 2001 and from Cowles and associates from 1871-1925 
to study to what extent the dividend policy matters. In particular, the authors investigate 
if managers should pay or hold back dividends according to their own internal growth 
projects. Arnott and Asness (2002) show that managers pay more dividends when they 
are optimistic. Moreover, they find that low payout ratios (high retention rates) precede 
low earnings growth, suggesting that a strong relation between these two events exists.  
 
Bulan, Subramanian, and Tanlun (2007) investigate the signaling theory using a sample 
of 445 U.S. dividend omissions over the 1962-2001 period.  Their results show that 
approximately 35% of dividend omissions are considered good news, signaling a 
turnaround in the fortunes of the omitting firms after a poor performance period. In 
contrast, supporting the lack of evidence concerning signaling theory, Li and Zhao 
(2008) use a CRSP/Compustat/IBES combined sample of 22,413 firm-year observations 
over the 1983-2003 period, and investigate the relation between a firm’s dividend policy 
and the quality of its information environment. The authors find that firms which suffer 
from information asymmetry tend to pay less in dividends, and are less likely to initiate 
and/or increase dividends. Similarly, Khang and King (2002) use a sample of all 
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publicly listed firms reporting to the SEC from January 1982 to December 1995 to 
explore the relation between dividends, insider trading gains and information 
asymmetry. In line with the free cash flow, and institutional monitoring theories, Khang 
and King (2002) show that firms which pay high dividends are not as exposed to 
asymmetry of information problems as similar firms exhibiting lower dividend payout 
ratios. In addition, the authors find that the more generous the dividend payout ratio the 
less insiders stand to gain by trading on their firms’ shares. Finally, in line with Li and 
Zhao (2008), Khang and King (2002) find little evidence to support that dividend 
changes act as a signaling mechanism.  
 
In contrast with Khang and King’s (2002) results, Yoon and Starks (1995) observe 
3,748 dividend increase and 431 dividend decrease announcements over the 1969 to 
1988 period for a sample of U.S. firms. Their study focus on potential explanations for 
dividend change announcements and is based on two main hypotheses: 1) the cash flow 
signaling hypothesis, according to which a dividend change delivers information 
concerning current and/or future cash flows; and 2) the free cash flow hypothesis, under 
which a dividend change offers information about the incorrect use of cash flows by 
managers. Yoon and Starks (1995) findings are consistent with the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis as there is no evidence to suggest that managers reveal information 
concerning their investment policies when dividend announcement occur.  
 
Chen, Shevlin and Tong (2004) use a sample of 2,981 firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or the NASDAQ from April 1974 to March 1999, to investigate the hypothesis 
that dividend changes are associated with changes in firms´ information risk. Chen et al 
(2004) show that information risk increases in the three year window following a 
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dividend decrease announcement. The authors also find that analysts’ forecast 
dispersion, and stock return volatility is more pronounced for such firms, suggesting 
they experience higher levels of uncertainty vis-à-vis their future prospects. As such, the 
evidence in Chen et al (2004) suggests that the information contained in dividends 
relates to changes in firms’ systematic risk (e.g., information risk), and changes in the 
uncertainty concerning firm’s future earnings and growth prospects. 
 
Dividends are also important for shedding light on the impact of agency theory in 
corporate finance. For instance, Farinha (2002) collects a sample of around 600 UK 
firms over two periods (1987-91 and 1992-96) and explores how agency issues affect 
the cross-sectional distribution of dividend policies. He shows that shareholders 
dispersion has a positive and substantial impact on the dividend policy as his results 
show a strong U-shaped relation between insider ownership and dividend payout. 
Furthermore, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2004) use a sample of US firms listed in 
the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX over the 1973-2002 period, and find a highly 
significant relation between the ratio of retained earnings and the decision to pay 
dividends. In particular, they show that firms with high amounts of earned equity are 
more prone to pay dividends, which supports the hypothesis that firms pay dividends to 
moderate agency costs. In a parallel study, Harada and Nguyen (2006) collect a sample 
of Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange from April 1995 to March 2002. 
They find that ownership concentration has great influence on how corporate decisions 
are made as it intensifies agency conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. 
In particular, a negative relation among dividend payout and ownership concentration is 
observed.  This relation can be explained by the following reasons: 1) dominant 
shareholders have some sources under their control where private benefits can be 
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extracted; and 2) shareholders protect their best interests by omitting dividends when 
investments opportunities improve. In sharp contrast, Naceur, Goaied and Belanes 
(2006) use a dynamic panel data model with data from 48 Tunisian firms over the 1996-
2002 period and find that ownership concentration does not impact dividend policy 
decisions. As the authors explain, looking at the Tunisian market is especially 
interesting as, contrary to other markets, the Tunisian government does not tax 
dividends or capital gains. 
 
Also drawing on agency theory, Kouki (2009) investigates the relation between 
executive compensation and dividend policy using a sample of 89 companies listed on 
Toronto Stock Exchange over the 2000-2003 period. The author develops a model 
where shareholders cannot observe managerial quality and effort and highlight that 
adding stock options to managers´ compensation package provides an incentive for 
executives to reduce corporate dividends. Kouki (2009) also argues that, in such 
context, forcing a higher dividend payout ratio is likely to reduce the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders. In a very recent study, following Harada 
and Nguyen (2002), Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2010) examine a sample of 12,876 
international firms over the 2000-2007 period to investigate the relation between 
institutional ownership and payout policy, supporting the existence of dividend 
clienteles around the world. In particular, Ferreira et al (2010) find that firms’ payout 
policy is influenced by the target payout ratio of the institutions holding the shares, 
which are defined according to tax, transaction costs, repatriation and reinvestment of 
dividends considerations.  
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Attempting to link the existence uncertainty in a firm to dividend policies, Bradley, 
Capozza and Seguin (1996) collect a sample of 75 firms listed in NAREIT (National 
Association of Real Estate Investment Firms) source book over the 1985-1992 period 
and find that the payout ratio has a negative (positive) correlation with expected 
uncertainty and firms’ leverage (firms diversification and size). In a subsequent paper, 
Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) emphasize the importance of firm-specific 
volatility and its determinants. The authors find that dividends vary with the total 
volatility of future cash flows and not just with systematic risk. The evidence put 
forward by Bradley et al (1998) suggest that managers use dividends to signal not only 
the expected level of earnings but also their volatility, which contradicts authors who 
find little evidence supporting signaling hypothesis (e.g. Li and Zhao, 2008 and Khang 
and King, 2002). 
 
Chay and Suh (2009) explore a sample of more than 5,000 firms from seven countries 
(Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK. and the U.S) over the 1994-2005 
period. They contribute to the existing literature by showing that cash flow uncertainty 
is a crucial determinant of the payout policy at an international level. In particular, Chay 
and Suh (2009) focus on the level of the dividend payout rather than on the changes in 
dividends as most of the prior studies does (e.g. Chen, Shevlin and Tong, 2004; Yoon 
and Starks, 1995).  They find that firms with high cash flow uncertainty avoid paying 
dividends and prefer using share repurchases as such alternative increases managers’ 
flexibility. Moreover, cash flow uncertainty is not only an important factor in explaining 
the cross-sectional variation of the amount and probability of dividends but also in 
explaining a firm’s choice of payout method. Chay and Suh (2009) also show that cash 
flow uncertainty has a stronger impact on dividends when compared to other expected 
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determinants (e.g. agency conflicts, earned/contributed capital mix and investment 
opportunities). 
 
4.2.2 Information uncertainty 
The impact and relevance of information uncertainty in financial markets has been the 
focus of some empirical studies, concerning the market´s reaction and its behavior. For 
example, Kandel and Pearson (1995) are among the first to explore how IU affects stock 
returns providing empirical evidence on the relation between the volume of trade and 
stock returns concerning public announcements. The authors compile a sample of 
announcements of stock splits and stock dividends between 1992 and 1993 and 
investigate how investors interpret such public signals. They find that agents have 
different interpretations of the public announcement which means that information is 
interpreted differently according to each individual. Overall it is subjective. 
 
Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2005) work with all firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ during the period from January 1965 through December 2001 to investigate 
the relation between IU and the cross-section of returns from a behavioral perspective. 
In particular, Jiang et al. (2005) examine whether the level of uncertainty is positively 
correlated with investor overconfidence. They find that: 1) high-IU firms earn lower 
future returns than low-IU firms (the “mean effect”); 2) the price and earnings 
momentum are much stronger among high-IU firms than low-IU firms (the “interaction 
effect”). In a parallel study, Zhang (2006a) considers a sample of U.S. firms collected 
over the 1983-2001 period and explores the association between IU (defined in terms of 
value ambiguity) and stock returns. In particular, he focuses on how prices change after 
the release of public information in the presence of IU. Under the hypothesis that 
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underreaction is stronger for high-IU firms, Zhang (2006a) concludes that expected 
returns are higher (lower) in cases of greater (lower) uncertainty following good (bad) 
news. In turn, this suggests the market has a slower response rate to news event when 
there is extra ambiguity regarding the implications of such events for firms’ value.  
 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper (2003) examine three types of accounting-based 
anomalies: PEAD (based on both analyst’s forecasts and seasonal random walk 
forecasts), value-glamour strategies (book-to-market, cash flow-to-price, and earnings-
to-price) and accruals strategies (total accruals and abnormal accruals). They refer to IU 
as the precision or quality of an investment signal, in that poor quality signals have high 
IU while good quality signals have low IU. Francis et al. (2003) find that IU plays an 
important role in explaining accounting anomalies using a sample of U.S. firms over the 
1982-2001 period. In particular, the authors show that the PEAD, the value-glamour 
effect and accruals trading strategies are all highly correlated with firm’s earnings 
quality, i.e., abnormal returns  are associated with the abovementioned measures of a 
firm’s quality of accounting information (IU). Similarly, Angelini and Guazzarotti 
(2009) examine a sample of companies listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ over the 
1985-2005 period and show a negative relation between stock price adjustment to news 
and the level of IU. The authors also provide new evidence concerning the post-earnings 
announcement drift by showing that such market pricing anomaly is not related to IU. 
This result is clearly at odds with that of Lee (2007), who uses both quarterly and 
annual earnings forecasts over the 1989 to 2005 period to investigate the relation 
between IU and PEAD.  
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Attempting to link firms acquisitions and IU, Erickson, Wang and Zhang (2007) explore 
a sample of 3,514 acquisitions taking place between 1985 and 2003. They show that, for 
acquirers, such corporate event leads, on average, to an increase in IU. Moreover, 
Erickson et al. (2007) find that the market tends to anticipate the negative effects (i.e., 
changes in information) of acquisitions, which results in negative abnormal returns 
around the announcement date. However, statistically, such effect is only significant 
when IU is proxied by the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts.  
 
Finally, in an important contribution to the literature, Zhang (2006b) collects data for 
49,923 firm-year observations over the 1983-2001 window, and shows that analysts, 
who are considered to be sophisticated market participants, tend to underreact to new 
information in the case of high-IU firms. In particular, their revisions are far from being 
complete in presence of great uncertainty and relatively complete in presence of low IU. 
Such evidence indicates that IU leads to slower revision of analysts’ forecasts, a 
phenomenon that seems especially important in the case of bad news. 
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5.  CONCLUSION 
This chapter concludes the present dissertation. Section 5.1 presents some research 
opportunities based on the findings of my systematic review. Section 5.2 examines the 
robustness of the methodology employed in this study. Section 5.3 describes my 
learning experience and Section 5.4 concludes. 
 
5.1 Implications for further research 
This systematic literature review on dividend policy and information uncertainty 
confirms that to date, with the exception of Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1996 and 
1998) and Chay and Suh (2009), no study has connected both subjects. As mentioned in 
Section 2.4, the aim of this review is to link dividend policy and information uncertainty 
in order to find a suitable gap in the literature for future research. The review of the 
selected papers confirms that some issues in these areas remain unclear and represent 
opportunities to explore them in a doctoral research. 
 
For example, preview studies show that a firm’s dividend policy depends on the level of 
IU.  Some papers argue that managers tend to pay more dividends to mitigate agency 
costs when firms are characterized by high-IU (e.g. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz, 
2004, Farinha, 2002, Kouki, 2009). In contrast, Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1996; 
1998) and Harada and Nguyen, (2006) suggest that managers tend to reduce the payout 
ratio in high IU-firms and Naceur, Goaied and Belanes (2006) argue that ownership 
concentration does not impact dividend policy decisions. As such, conflicting evidence 
suggests that the relation between dividend policy and the level of IU may depend on 
specific environments (e.g. different legal, institutional, economic and cultural issues). 
 Universidade Do Algarve 
 
32 
Dividend Policy and Information Uncertainty 
A comprehensive study in this area may be important to define the characteristics 
associated with a positive or negative relation. 
 
Existing literature shows that firms with high levels of information asymmetry tend to 
have high levels of IU and lower dividend payouts. For example, Chen, Shevlin and 
Tong (2004) find that the information contained in dividends relates to changes in firm-
uncertainty. Zhang, (2006a), Li and Zhao, (2008), Khang and King (2002), Chay and 
Suh, (2009) find that high asymmetry leads managers to pay lower dividends. How can 
this information asymmetry be controlled so it does not affect the level of IU? This is an 
interesting research avenue. 
 
Existing literature suggests that managers signal a firm’s financial situation (expected 
level of earnings, volatility) by managing the dividend payout ratio. For instance, 
Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1996 and 1998) and Chay and Suh (2009) manage the 
payout ratio according to the level of cash flow uncertainty. In contrast, Khang and 
King (2002) and Li and Zhao (2008) find little evidence that dividends act as signaling 
mechanism. Moreover, Kandel and Pearson (1995) support the idea that agents interpret 
public signals in a different way and Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlun (2007) present 
some new evidence concerning signaling theory showing that 35% of dividend 
omissions can be considered good news. Therefore, should dividends act or not as a 
signaling mechanism? And how can they be interpreted in a singular way by all agents? 
 
All these questions are worthy of investigation 
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5.2. Methodology appraisal 
The present study uses the systematic literature review approach to review existing 
academic literature concerning dividend policy and information uncertainty. Although 
an improvement vis-à-vis the traditional approach, the systematic literature review is not 
free of criticism as one can always disagree with the keywords and exclusion criteria 
that are needed for implementing the search protocol. The panel has a fundamental role 
here. Moreover, selecting papers based on their titles and abstracts may lead to the 
exclusion of some studies that others may think are relevant for the study at hand. 
Therefore, one must recognize that the definition of the study´s refined scope ends up 
being somewhat tainted by the personal choices of the researcher. Likewise, the 
classification of papers based on the quality appraisal tool is also subjective, since 
different researchers may classify studies differently.  
 
5.3. Learning Experience 
The systematic review of the literature revealed itself to be a continuous learning 
process. The finance area has developed like not many other areas in the social domain 
earning the attention of the academic community around the world. Many studies in this 
area are a relevant contribution for the development of human knowledge. Hence, and 
due to the vast literature that exists in this area, it is very useful to develop a systematic 
literature review. Traditionally, researchers would wonder around the existing literature 
on a random basis, collecting whichever information they thought was important for 
their research topic but at the present time, this approach does not provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the research field in which the researcher is interested 
in. That is why it is necessary to do a systematic literature review which provides 
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solutions to the limitations of the traditional literature review. The following points 
summarize my most relevant thoughts on this issue: 
1. Implementing a systematic review of the literature requires some knowledge 
about the research subject. A preliminary work of an explanatory nature must be 
first undertaken. Moreover, the panel plays a fundamental role by providing 
useful expert advice and comments when the researcher is not totally familiar 
with the subject; 
2. This methodology also requires some database skills; 
3. It is essential to define a set of reliable keywords and combine them in search 
strings. It is also key to have exclusion criteria that work.  
4. The implementation of the quality assessment tool turned out to be more 
difficult than I thought. This is very subjective and the panel plays an important 
role drawing on their knowledge and expertise. 
5. It is not possible to apply this methodology to other sources of information than 
academic papers (e.g., books). It provides a well-defined framework for doing a 
literature review but is not an ultimate search tool.  
 
To sum up, the systematic literature review presents many advantages compared to the 
traditional approach. Despite all the advantages, the researcher must develop skills in 
specific areas like managing literature databases, must have a balanced consultation 
panel, be ready to take some important decisions and be aware that this methodology 
has some limitations. Importantly, complementing the research process with alternative 
methods of data collection is clearly a must. Nevertheless, when properly used, this 
method allows identifying suitable gaps in the literature and also refining the initial set 
of research questions. 
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5.4. Concluding Remarks 
This dissertation employs the systematic literature review methodology to identify and 
assess the academic literature addressing dividend policy and information uncertainty, 
providing support for the connection between both subjects. This study finds a potential 
gap in the extant literature, which seems interesting for pursuing at the doctoral level. 
 
The systematic review used in this dissertation represents an alternative method to avoid 
weakness of the traditional approach. The conduction of this process gave additional 
value to my findings and conclusions, but as quoted by Hart (1998) “There is no such 
thing as the perfect review”. 
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Appendix 1 – Summary of the Selected Papers 
 
 
No Study 
Research 
Category 
Sample 
Size 
Year 
range Finding(s) 
1 Angelini and  Guazzarotti (2009) Empirical N/A 1985-2005 Stock prices characterized by high uncertainty 
react more slowly to news; 
          In the case of positive surprises for high 
uncertainty stocks, the price adjusts 
immediately. 
2 Arnott and Asness (2001) Empirical N/A 1926-2001 Low payout ratios (high retention rates) 
historically precede low earnings growth; 
          When managers are optimistic they tend to 
pay higher dividends and when they are 
pessimistic tend to pay lower dividends. 
3 Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1996) Empirical 75 1985-1992 When managers anticipate uncertain future 
cash flows they tend to reduce the payout 
ratio to avoid the possibility of having to 
reduce dividends in the future.  
4 Bradley, Capozza and Seguin (1998) Empirical N/A 1985-1992 The existence of a discrete reduction penalty 
implies that managers will use dividend 
policy to signal not only the expected level of 
earnings but also their volatility; 
          Dividends levels vary with the total of 
volatility of future cash flows and not just 
with the systematic or market-related 
component risk suggesting that higher levels 
of expected uncertainty are associated with 
lower payout ratios. 
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5 Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu 
(2007) 
Empirical 445 1962-2001 35% of dividend omissions are actually good 
news which signals a turnaround in the 
fortunes of the omitting firms after a period of 
poor performance. 
6 Chay and Suh (2009) Empirical 5000 1994-2005 Firms with high cash flow uncertainty appears 
to be an important factor, not only in 
explaining firm´s sectional variation of the 
amount and probability of dividends, but also, 
in explaining a firm´s choice of payout 
method. 
7 Chen, Shevlin and Tong (2004) Empirical 2981 1974-1999 The information contained in dividends is not 
about future earnings, but more about changes 
in firm´s systematic risks, including 
information risks and changes in the 
uncertainty regarding firm´s future earnings 
and growth prospects. 
 
8 
 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2004) 
 
Empirical 
 
N/A 
 
1973-2002 
 
Evidence concerning the relation between the 
decision to pay dividends and the ratio of 
earned equity to total equity or total assets; 
     Firms pay dividends to mitigate agency costs 
associated with high cash and low dept capital 
structures. 
9 Erickson, Wang and Zhang (2007) Empirical 3514 1985-2003 On average, acquisitions lead to an increase in 
IU for acquirers. 
10 Farinha (2002) Empirical  600 1987-1991  
1992-1996 
Results favor the predictions of the dividend 
agency theory. 
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11 Ferreira, Matos e Massa (2010) Empirical 12876 2000-2007 Shifts in ownership structure may help 
explain why firms are paying less in 
dividends and paying less often in recent 
years concerning dividend clienteles around 
the world. 
12 Francis, LaFond, Olsson and 
Schipper 
Empirical N/A 1982-2001 Information uncertainty plays an important 
role in explaining accounting anomalies; 
     Post-earnings- announcement-drift, the value-
glamour effect and accruals trading strategies 
are all correlated with firm´s earnings quality. 
13 Harada and Nguyen (2006) Empirical 6397 1995-2002 Ownership concentration plays a critical role 
in corporate decisions since shareholders 
interests are better represented in the presence 
of large shareholders which intensifies agency 
conflicts; 
          Dividend payout is negatively related to 
ownership concentration. 
14 Jiang, Lee and Zhang (2005) Empirical N/A 1965-2001 High information uncertainty firms earn lower 
future returns than firms with lower 
information uncertainty; 
          Price and earnings momentum effects are 
much stronger among firms with high 
information uncertainty than among firms 
with low information uncertainty. 
15 Kandel and Pearson (1995) Empirical N/A 1992-1993  
1981-1992 
Evidence contrasting the idea that agents 
interpret public signals in the same way. 
16 Khang and King (2002) Empirical N/A 1982-1995 Little evidence to support the idea that 
dividends may act as a signaling mechanism 
to the market. 
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 17 Kouki (2009) Empirical 89 2000-2003 Adding stock options to the key managers´ 
compensation package provides an incentive 
for them to reduce corporate dividends; 
     Forcing a higher dividend payout ratio should 
help reduce agency conflicts. 
18 Lee (2007) Empirical  N/A 1989-2005 Information uncertainty is positively 
associated with the post-earnings-
announcements-drift. 
19 Li and Zhao (2008) Empirical 22413 1983-2003 Firms with higher levels of information 
uncertainty are less likely to make dividends 
payments, to initiate dividends and to increase 
dividends; 
     Asymmetric information and dividend policy 
are negative correlated. 
 
20 
 
Naceur, Goaied and Belanes (2006) 
 
Empirical 
 
48 
 
1996-2002 
 
Firms rely more on current earnings than past 
dividends to fix their dividends payments; 
     Highly profitable firms with more stable 
earnings enjoy larger free cash flows and 
consequently can afford higher dividends. 
21 Yoon and Starks (1995) Empirical 3748-431 1969-1988 Stock price reaction to large dividend 
announcements is generally consistent with 
the predictions of the cash flow signaling 
hypothesis. 
22 Zhang (2006) Empirical 49923 1983-2001 Analyst´s revisions are far from complete in 
cases of greater uncertainty. 
23 Zhang (2006) Empirical N/A 1983-2001 Greater information uncertainty produce 
relatively higher expected returns following 
good news and lower expected returns 
following bad news. 
